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Implications of Alternative Policies on Nitrate
Contamination of Groundwater
Manzoor E. Chowdhury and Ronald D. Lacewell
This study estimates the cost effectiveness  of alternative environmental policies for control-
ling nitrate contamination  of groundwater in the Seymour aquifer region of Texas. Results
from a biophysical  simulation model are integrated with a farm-level optimization  model.
The study  also compares  the cost  of bottled water,  used  as the lower-bound  estimate  of
benefits  of groundwater  protection,  with the  least costly  environmental  policy.  Results
indicate  that the least-cost  policy  alternative  for the region is  about  $1  million either  to
farmers or to the local government  and it is approximately three times the cost  of bottled
water.
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Introduction
In the U.S., nitrate is te most widespread agriculturally  related chemical found in ground-
water  samples  (Swinton  and  Clark).  Agriculture  is  perceived  as  a  major  contributor  of
nitrates,  primarily  from  the  use  of nitrogen  fertilizers  (U.S.  Environmental  Protection
Agency; Nielsen and Lee; Office of Technology Assessment).  Over 97% of rural America's
drinking water comes from groundwater and 40% of the population served by public water
supplies uses groundwater (Nielsen and Lee). Nitrates in drinking water  es itecan  cause methamo-
globinemia, or "blue baby disease," but only at levels far above the EPA standard of 10 parts
per million (Fan, Willhite, and Book). Nevertheless, the long-term health risk of consuming
water with nitrates  is not fully understood, and opinion research indicates that consumers,
particularly those with children, are wary of risks (Winter, Seiber,  and Nuckton). Pollution
of groundwater  is generally  irreversible,  and  the diffuse  nature of nitrate contamination
makes  it more difficult to control than  many other forms of pollution.  These factors have
combined to make agricultural nitrate management an important policy issue.
Policymakers  desire  policies  that  will protect  groundwater  quality  while minimizing
adverse effects on farm income. Several policy alternatives for dealing with nonpoint source
(NPS) pollution have been proposed.  At the theoretical level, Griffin and Bromley focused
on the choice  between  standards  and  incentives  for agriculture.  More  recent  theoretical
literature focused on the properties of tax instruments based on ambient concentrations (e.g.,
Cabe  and  Herriges;  Segerson  1988;  Xepapadeas),  liability  rules  (e.g.,  Segerson  1990;
Wetzstein and Centner),  and firm-specific taxes and standards based on emissions or inputs
associated with emissions (e.g., Shortle and Dunn; Miltz, Braden, and Johnson; Shortle and
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Abler;  Abler).  Along  with  these  theoretical  developments,  empirical  research  on  NPS
pollution has traditionally followed the "indirect approach"  (Dosi and Moretto; Shortle and
Dunn),  which  suggests basing  policies  on actual  NPS  emissions estimated  by  available
biophysical  simulation  models.  These  studies  largely  involved  integrating  available  or
simulated data with economic optimization models (e.g., Anderson, Opaluch, and Sullivan;
Diebel et al.; Foltz  et al.; Huang  and  Lantin; Johnson,  Adams,  and Perry;  Kramer et al.;
Mapp et al.; McSweeny  and Shortle; Painter and Young; Taylor, Adams, and Miller; Wu,
Mapp,  and Bernardo).
The  intent  of our  article  is  to  contribute  to  the  empirical  literature  by  evaluating
alternative  policies  for controlling  nitrate  contamination  of groundwater  in the  Seymour
aquifer region of Texas. The motivation for this article stems from the opportunity to improve
and  build upon  the  existing empirical  studies.  A number of issues have  been  somewhat
ignored  or  not fully  examined  in past  studies.  First,  an important  consideration  for the
groundwater  contamination  problem is  the need  to  model the  movement of agricultural
chemicals  from the point of discharge to the point of entry into the aquifer.  Studies to date
have considered nutrient or pesticide percolation  only to the bottom of the plant root zone.
Second, risk behavior of farmers has received scant attention in the empirical literature of
NPS pollution. Not incorporating risk aversion may lead to erroneous predictions about how
farmers  will respond to  environmental policies.  Third,  in most studies, government  farm
program  provisions  have  not  been  incorporated  in  the  economic  model.  Finally,  while
numerous studies have focused on the costs of agricultural pollution reduction measures, no
attempt has been made to compare the costs with a measure of benefits.
An additional motivation for this study arises from the urgency of studying an important
environmental issue in Texas. Groundwater in the Seymour aquifer region contains elevated
nitrate levels (Texas Water Commission; Neilsen and Lee). The aquifer is very shallow, and
the soil is sandy and porous. The aquifer is the only source of groundwater for the area, and
many residents do not have access to municipal water.  Designated  s a hydrologic unit area
under the president's water quality initiative,  the Seymour aquifer is one of 45 projects in
34 states that the U.S.  Department of Agriculture  implemented in  1991  to speed adoption
of best management practices to improve water quality. The nitrate-nitrogen content of 62
water samples collected from the Seymour formation in 1962 varied from 5-41 ppm (parts
per million) with 39 samples exceeding the EPA standard of 10 ppm (Ogilbee and Osborne).
More recent  studies (Kreitler;  Harden and Associates; Aurelius)  confirm that much of the
water in the Seymour aquifer is well above the EPA drinking-water standard of 10 ppm.
Empirical Procedures and Data
Because of unavailable data on nitrate percolation and crop yield for alternative production
practices,  EPIC-WQ  (Erosion  Productivity  Impact Calculator-Water  Quality)  simulation
model  was  used  to  simulate  crop  yield and  nitrate  percolation  for the  study  area.  Data
generated  by  EPIC-WQ  were  used  to  estimate  yield  and  nitrate  percolation  response
functions.  The  response  functions  were  incorporated  inside  a  risk-sensitive  farm-level
optimization model which was used to measure the economic and environmental impact of
1 According  to the proponents  of this  approach, while such biophysical  models  will never provide  a perfect  substitute  for
accurate  monitoring  of actual  flows, "...they  can  serve as an important  tool for diminishing the uncertainty  about nonpoint
loadings...furthermore,  predictions obtained from such models offer an alternative  to actual flows as a basis for the application
of policy instruments"  (Shortle and Dunn, p. 668).
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alternative policies. Finally, the cost of bottled water, a lower-bound estimate of benefits of
groundwater protection, was compared with the least costly environmental  policy.
Application of EPIC-WQ
EPIC-WQ is composed of physically based components for processes of soil erosion, plant
growth,  weather,  hydrology,  nutrient  cycling,  tillage,  soil  temperature,  and  economics
(Sharpley  and Williams). The  model has been tested extensively  and used in a number of
local, regional, and national studies to investigate the effects of weather, soil, and agricultural
management practices on crop yields, soil erosion, and nutrient cycling (Cabelguenne et al.;
Jones and O'Toole). EPIC-WQ, however, cannot model the geohydrology of an aquifer, and
here the model is used only to simulate crop yield and nitrate percolation.  Thus, while the
concentration of percolated  nitrate may not immediately translate  into well water concen-
tration, a reduction in concentration of percolated nitrate is expected to reduce the concen-
tration of nitrate in well water, particularly in the long run.
EPIC-WQ' s soil database maintains a two-meter soil data profile for different regions of
the country. To modify the EPIC-WQ  model by incorporating  the  model  atvadose  zone, thirty-six
well logs were selected from a Texas Department of Water Resource's study on the Seymour
aquifer (Harden and Associates).  With the help of EPIC-WQ model developers (Williams;
Benson), the vadose zone was divided into five layers,  and these layers  were added below
the  topsoil  in  the  EPIC-WQ  model.  This  enabled  the EPIC-WQ  model  to  simulate  the
percolation of nitrate through the vadose zone and into the aquifer.
EPIC-WQ was validated for irrigated cotton by using the data from a nitrogen-phospho-
rus  fertility  study  on irrigated  cotton  cononducted  by  the  Texas  Agricultural  Experiment
Station in Munday (Kramp). For dryland cotton and dryland wheat, the model was validated
by using the  crop yield data from the Natural Resource  Conservation  Service (Seymour.
Aquifer Hydrologic  Unit Project).  Results from the U.S. Geological  Survey (USGS)  well
testing (two wells drilled in 1992) in the Gilliland/Truscott segment of the Seymour aquifer
were used to validate EPIC-WQ for nitrate percolation to the aquifer. The Gilliland/Truscott
segment  is  small,  isolated  from the  main  segment  of the  Seymour  aquifer,  and  has  no
intensive agricultural production activities. By using the well logs and by simulating native
pasture production for fifty years, nitrate leaching results were obtained from EPIC-WQ and
compared with well testing results.
Estimation  of  Response Functions
Data generated by EPIC-WQ were used to estimate response functions for crop yield and
percolated nitrate for irrigated cotton, dryland cotton, and dryland wheat. The independent
variables used in estimating these functions were preplant nitrogen fertilizer applications,
postplant  nitrogen  fertilizer  applications,  irrigation  applications  during  three  specified
periods, rainfall during the growing season, soil types, and tillage practices.
2EPIC-WQ  simulation of native pasture scenario for two wells were 6.2 ppm and 5.7 ppm compared with actual well tests of
9.3 ppm and 8.4 ppm, respectively.  This suggests that the EPIC-WQ generated value may be slightly lower than actual, but the
relationship  of one value to another is in the right direction. Furthermore,  since the USGS results were obtained by single well
tests only (instead  of repeated testing of the  same site), the discrepancy  between the well tests and simulated values  does not
necessarily  reflect any weakness in EPIC-WQ.
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The crop yield response  functions were estimated  with ordinary  least squares  (OLS).
Functional  forms considered were  required to allow a positive crop yield for a zero input
level and to  allow the first derivatives to be unrestricted in sign  and value. These criteria
resulted in the preliminary selection of four functional forms: quadratic, three-halves, square
root, and cubic. Using the highest adjusted R2 and the lowest Schwarz criterion, the quadratic
form was  chosen  for irrigated cotton  and dryland  wheat,  and the three-halves  form was
chosen for dryland cotton.
Nitrate percolation values obtained from EPIC-WQ composed a censored sample since
percolation values were often zero, and positive percolation values were observed only under
certain climatic events and input levels. Ordinary least squares with censored data produce
biased  and  inconsistent  parameter  estimates  (Maddala;  Amemiya).  A  sample  selection
model introduced by Heckman was used to estimate the response functions for percolated
nitrate. Unlike the tobit model, the Heckman model is better suited for situations where the
probability  of  occurrence  of nitrate  percolation  and  the  amount  of percolation  is  not
intimately related.
The  main  criterion  used  for  choosing  the  appropriate  functional  forms  for  nitrate
percolation  functions was the ability to include nitrate  leaching even when no production
inputs were  used.  This choice criterion  is particularly important for the  Seymour aquifer
area,  where  some  nitrate  contamination  may  have  originated  from  natural  soil  nitrates
(Harris).  Allowing  an intercept  for the nitrate  percolation  function  resulted in  the initial
selection  of  six  functional  forms:  linear,  semi-log,  cubic,  quadratic,  square  root,  and
three-halves.  The linear form showed a poor fit, suggesting that percolation of nitrate is a
nonlinear process. The final selection was made from semi-log, quadratic, cubic, square root,
and  three-halves.  Using  the  highest  adjusted  R2  and  the  lowest  Schwarz  criterion,  the
semi-log (log of dependent variable) form was selected for all three crops.
Risk-Sensitive Farm-Level  Modeling
Agricultural production is generally risky, and many farmers exhibit risk-averse behavior,
sacrificing income for reduced risk (Lin, Dean, and Moore). Lambert showed that excluding
risk gives misleading costs and benefits of regulatory policies. A risk-sensitive farm-level
model  was  developed  for  a  representative  1,500-acre  farm  to  determine  the  expected-
profit-maximizing farm plan with and without environmental  policies.  The optimization
model was static and was based on expected-value-standard  deviation utility:
MEANINCOME - Pk  {(DEVk+)2 + (DEV  )2
The above  objective  function  maximizes  expected  net income  minus  a risk-aversion
coefficient  (p)  times the standard deviation of income.5 The risk-aversion  coefficient  (A)
3 In an agricultural  setting influenced  by stochastic weather,  it is not hard to imagine a scenario where a particular soil or
tillage practice might have a lower probability of percolation, but might also have greater average percolation when percolation
actually occurs.
4 The representative  farm size was selected after consulting with local extension  economists and officials  at the Seymour
aquifer hydrologic  unit project (Bevers; Lamberth).
This expected-value-standard  deviation formulation can be considered as a generalized form of expected-value-variance
(E-V) and MOTAD (minimization of  total absolute deviation) model. By dropping the square root exponent, the model becomes
an E-V model. Similarly, by dropping the square root exponent and by not squaring the deviation terms, it becomes a MOTAD
model.
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can be interpreted as the number of standard errors one wishes to discount income  and thus
ranges  between  0 and  2.5  in most  circumstances.  The term DEVk refers  to positive  and
negative  deviation of net income from mean net income under the kth state of nature. Pk is
the probability of observing any state of nature k (which is one divided by the total number
of states of nature). The model maximizes the objective function subject to various site-spe-
cific  resource  constraints,  farm  program  provisions,  and  environmental  policies.  These
environmental policies include  a performance  standard,  a performance  tax, a performance
subsidy,  an  input  tax  (nitrogen),  an  input  subsidy  (nitrogen),  and  some  selected  design
standards (split application of fertilizer, adoption of minimum tillage, and adoption of both
split fertilizer application  and minimum tillage).
Results and Discussion
Table 1 reports the mean net income (revenues net of variable cost only), standard deviation
of  net  income,  and  average  per  acre  nitrate  percolation  (in  ppm)  for  the  baseline  and
alternative policy scenarios. Farmers are discouraged from planting crops other than the base
crop because every acre of base planted in another crop reduces the size of their deficiency
payment. With additional constraints,  such as limits on percolation of nitrate, the choice of
alternative farm plans  is narrower.  Thus, the model  solution was sensitive only at the two
extremes of risk behavior considered (risk neutrality and high risk aversion). The results are
listed under two categories:  risk neutral (RAC = 0) and risk averse (RAC = 2.5).
Farm-Level Implications
The  base case, which represents  conventional  producer behavior in  the Seymour aquifer
area, provides a benchmark against which the effects of alternative policies can be evaluated.
The baseline results replicate  the conventional  management  practices,  acreage  allocation
between crops, and farmer profit for the area (Texas Agricultural  Statistics  Service; Texas
Agricultural Extension Service). The management practices include preplant application of
fertilizer, conventional tillage, and irrigation during three specified periods. Other manage-
ment practices or options available  to farmers that were incorporated in the model include
split  application  of fertilizer,  minimum  tillage,  various  combinations  of crop  mix,  and
allocation of crops to alternative  soil.
The primary changes in management practice observed  due to a performance  standard
were  a  decrease  in fertilizer  rate  applied  for all  crops,  a  switch  to minimum  tillage  for
irrigated cotton, and a split application of fertilizer for wheat.  Irrigation levels did not show
any major change under the performance  standard,  as lower irrigation levels substantially
reduced yield and had a negligible effect on the concentration of percolated nitrate. The split
fertilizer application in wheat offset some yield decline, although costs for split application
were slightly higher. The net income losses under a performance standard were $6,300 and
$5,200 for the risk-neutral and risk-averse case, respectively.
Percolation can also be targeted with a "pricing" instrument such as a performance tax.
The performance  taxes  that would keep the concentration  of percolated  nitrate  below  10
ppm  were  estimated  as  $0.83  per ppm/acre  (risk neutral)  and  $0.80  per ppm/acre  (risk
averse).  The optimal farm plan under the performance tax (risk neutral case) was similar to
the farm-plan under the performance standard, since an appropriate performance tax imposes
the same abatement cost as a standard. The result thus confirms the theoretical proposition
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Table 1. Farm-Level Results for Baseline  and Alternative Environmental Policies
Risk Neutral  Risk Averse
Concentration  Concentration
of Nitrate  of Nitrate
Net  Standard  Percolated into  Net  Standard  Percolated into
Income  Deviation  the Aquifer  Income  Deviation  the Aquifer
Scenario  ($)a  ($)a  (ppm)  (  ($)($)a  (ppm)
Baseline  154,600  24,000  15.56  148,400  21,400  14.68
Performance
standard  148,300  23,700  9.91  143,200  22,200  9.76
Performance
tax  137,200  24,300  9.91  133,100  22,100  9.76
Performance
subsidy  155,000  23,600  9.96  149,200  23,000  9.88
Input tax
(nitrogen)  124,900  27,300  9.95  111,500  18,800  9.79
Input subsidy
(nitrogen)  159,000  23,400  9.95  156,700  21,800  9.83
Split fertilizer
application  149,400  23,400  13.23  143,300  21,500  12.84
Minimum
tillage  153,700  24,000  13.75  147,600  21,100  13.16
Split fertilizer
and minimum
tillage  148,700  23,900  12.26  142,500  21,800  11.81
aRounded to the nearest hundred.
that when farms  are identical,  a performance  standard is a quantity dual of a performance
tax. Net income is substantially reduced under the performance tax (11.25%  and 10.3%  for
risk-neutral and risk-averse cases, respectively) because of tax payments paid on every unit
of percolated nitrate and abatement costs.
A performance subsidy  can provide the same incentive as a performance  tax when the
opportunity cost is the same for a subsidy as it is for a tax. The decision maker can pay taxes
by polluting  more or can receive  a subsidy  by polluting  less.  The policies  would differ,
however,  with respect to distribution  of income  and political  acceptability.  Performance
subsidies of $0.83 (risk-neutral case) and $0.80 (risk-averse case) per ppm of reduced nitrate
percolation  were used  starting at the baseline  percolation  level and effective  down to  10
ppm. The performance  subsidy resulted in the same farm plan as a performance tax for the
risk-neutral case.  This result  supports  the theoretical  proposition  that  a  performance  tax
provides the same incentive  as a performance  subsidy.  For the risk-averse  case, however,
6 Some authors  have shown that this symmetric  effect of tax and subsidy for the risk-neutral  case is valid only for a static
analysis but not for a dynamic analysis  (e.g., Kim et al.).
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irrigation was used more intensively on irrigated acres and less fertilizer was used on dryland
wheat. The subsidy let the farmer cover the extra cost of additional irrigation applications.
Consequently, the net abatement costs of tax and subsidy policies were not identical under
risk aversion. As shown by Baumol and Oates, this asymmetric income effect between tax
and subsidy  occurs because  taxes reduce  after-tax  profits, whereas  the subsidy  increases
postsubsidy profits.
Input taxes are particularly attractive for a situation when actual emissions are unobserv-
able or too costly to monitor.  A nitrogen fertilizer tax was used in the model by increasing
the price of nitrogen fertilizer so that percolated nitrate into the aquifer was reduced to the
EPA  standard of 10 ppm.  The loss of profit under a nitrogen tax was substantial,  since  a
farmer  was  forced  to  make  drastic  reduction  in fertilizer  use.  For  a  risk-neutral  and  a
risk-averse farmer, the tax on nitrogen was estimated at $0.60/lb. and $0.72/lb.  The tax was
approximately 200% to 250% of the purchase price of nitrogen, and it reduced fertilizer use
by 30% in irrigated cotton, 29% in dryland cotton, and 54% in dryland wheat. The net income
loss was approximately 20% and 25% for the risk-neutral and risk-averse cases, respectively.
These results imply that a single input tax would be very costly to producers.
An input subsidy to farmers  for using lower fertilizer compared with a baseline  is the
mirror image of an input tax. Farmers face a similar penalty  at the margin for nitrogen use.
An input subsidy was used in the model in which a farmer received  a subsidy of $0.60/lb.
and $0.72/lb. (risk-neutral and risk-averse cases, respectively) for every pound of nitrogen
used below the conventional level. Under risk neutrality, the farm mean income was $4,400
higher than the baseline with the same management plan as the nitrogen tax policy. The farm
plan under the risk-averse case, however, was slightly different because of the income effect
of the subsidy combined with risk behavior.
Design standards specify what actions must or must not be taken by landowners.  Three
design  standards  were  selected  to evaluate  the effect on farm  income  and water quality.
These included splitting applications of nitrogen fertilizer, adopting minimum tillage, and,
finally,  simultaneously  adopting  minimum  tillage  and  splitting  applications  of nitrogen
fertilizer. With a split fertilizer application, the mean net income was approximately  $5,000
lower than the base scenario (for both risk-neutral and risk-averse cases) because of the extra
cost of a split fertilizer application and because of postplant nitrogen's lower effect on yield.
The income loss under minimum tillage was approximately  $1,000,  as the slight yield loss
under minimum tillage was offset by the reduced cost of tillage. The effect of combined split
application  of fertilizer and minimum tillage was an income loss of approximately  $6,000
for both risk behavior scenarios.  In all three cases of design standards, the concentration of
nitrate percolated into the aquifer exceeds  10 ppm by approximately  20% to 40%.
Implications  for Nonparticipation  in Farm Programs
With the emphasis on reducing the federal budget, future government farm program supports
are  expected  to  decline.  Therefore,  the  economic  and  environmental  implications  of  a
nonparticipating farmer were considered. Approximately 90-95% of farms in the study area
participate in farm programs. Most farmers have established base acres in cotton and wheat
through  past production  history.  The  effect  of nonparticipation  was  evaluated  under  a
separate scenario in which no farm program constraints were used in the optimization model.
The estimated net income for a risk-neutral and risk-averse nonparticipating farmer was
approximately  $5,000 and $7,500 lower than the participating  risk-neutral  and risk-averse
farmer, respectively.  These income  losses would have been  larger if the nonparticipating
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farmer did not have the option of switching from wheat to cotton. Furthermore, a nonpar-
ticipating farmer is not required to set aside land and can use all available farm acres. Without
base acre requirements,  the risk-averse nonparticipating  farmer used more irrigated cotton
acreage because of lower variability of returns. Fertilization rates were  the same as for the
participating  scenario.  Wheat was not chosen because it is less profitable than cotton. The
average per acre percolation of nitrate was higher than for the participating  case, as the set
aside acres are cultivated.
Regional Implications and Comparison  of  Policy Options
To provide a basis for comparing costs of alternative policies at a regional level, the per acre
and farm-level results are extrapolated to the Seymour aquifer region. Of the 274,500 acres
in the Seymour aquifer area, approximately 218,200 acres are used for crop production. This
figure was derived by subtracting pasture and rangeland acres (25,000), CRP acres (26,300),
and other acres (5,000) not used for crop production (Seymour Aquifer HUA Project Annual
Report). The  Seymour aquifer area is relatively homogeneous with a predominantly sandy
soil  and  similar  production practices.  Thus,  although farms  are  not truly  identical,  this
aggregation  provides  some insight into the cost of controlling nitrate  percolation  for the
whole region.
The regional cost estimates are presented in table 2. These costs include net government
expenses and revenues as well as private producer welfare changes.  These estimates do not
include transaction costs such  as administration  costs, information costs, and enforcement
costs.  To review  the distribution  of farmer  and  government  costs  or revenues,  we  first
consider  a  performance  standard  and  a  performance  tax.  When  farms  are identical  (as
assumed  here),  a  performance  standard  is  generally  viewed  as  the  quantity  dual  of a
performance  tax. At equal control levels (10 ppm), both strategies showed identical abate-
ment costs ($976,000 for risk neutral and $820,000 for risk averse), but under a performance
tax, the reduction in farmers' net returns was higher ($2,722,000 and $2,391,000 for the two
cases) due to an additional $1,746,000 and $1,571,000 tax payment for the risk-neutral and
risk-averse case, respectively. Although a performance tax targets the problem more directly,
costs of monitoring and enforcement of a performance-based  tax would be high. Likewise,
while targeting would be relatively easy with a performance standard, enforcing a perform-
ance standard depends on farmers'  perceptions regarding the links between their behavior
and achieving the standard. Because of stochastic weather, difficulty of monitoring, and the
confounding role of neighboring  polluters,  that perceived link may be weak (Braden  and
Segerson).  Thus, targeting  and  enforcement  issues aside,  the only noteworthy  difference
between these policies is the added tax payments under a performance tax. This finding may
lend support to the Buchanan and Tullock hypothesis that farmers may prefer a standard to
a tax because of the added burden of a tax. However,  by judiciously using the redistributed
tax revenues, performance taxes can be used to significantly improve environmental quality.
A performance  tax scheme can have political  support if it is implemented as a subsidy
to reduce percolated nitrate from a base level. Some studies show that political acceptability
is more important than tax revenues (e.g., Oehmke  and Yao).  Without political  support, a
strongly noncooperative farm community could raise the transaction costs so high that any
policy to reduce agricultural nonpoint source pollution would be blocked. 7 The enforcement
/
7 Such an idea might encourage farmers to form "water quality cooperatives"  where the group as a whole would work toward
achieving the standard in order to be eligible for a package of benefits (Braden and Segerson).
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Table 2. Regional Implications of Alternative Environmental Policies
Risk Neutral  Risk Averse
Change  Total Tax  Change  Total Tax
in  Revenue or  in  Revenue or
Change in  Farm  Govt.  Change in  Farm  Govt.
FarmNet  Net  Subsidy  Farm Net  Net  Subsidy
Policy  Income  Income  Payment  Income  Income  Payment
Instrument  ($/thsd.)  (%)  ($/thsd.)  ($/thsd.)  (%)  ($/thsd.)
Performance
standard  (976)  (4.0)  0  (820)  (3.5)  0
Performance
tax  (2,722)  (11.2)  1,746  (2,391)  (10.3)  1,571
Performance
subsidy  71  0.25  (1,047)  123  0.54  (943)
Input tax
(nitrogen)  (4,659)  (19.2)  3,270  (5,794)  (24.8)  4,345
Input subsidy
(nitrogen)  702  2.9  (2,091)  1,300  5.6  (2,832)
Split fertilizer
application  (816)  (3.3)  0  (801)  (3.5)  0
Minimum
tillage  (141)  (0.6)  0  (126)  (0.53)  0
Split fertilizer
and minimum
tillage  (920)  (4.0)  0  (926)  (3.8)  0
Note: These figures do not include transaction costs.
problems  may  also be  reduced  under a  subsidy  policy by making  eligibility for certain
benefits contingent on meeting the standard. The estimated abatement cost of a performance
subsidy was the same as a performance tax and performance standard,  since it provided the
same economic  incentive  to control  nitrate percolation  at the margin. The abatement cost
was recovered through the performance  subsidy received,  and the net gain was $71,000 to
farmers.  The subsidy  outlay (government  costs)  was not as high as the tax payment made
by the farmers because the subsidy was paid only on the units of percolation reduced (from
the base level). The total government subsidy outlay for a performance  subsidy policy was
estimated to be $1,047,000 and $943,000 for the risk-neutral and risk-averse  scenarios.
Since accurate measurement of percolated nitrate is virtually impossible, ambient-based
policies discussed above are impractical  in an agricultural  setting. These estimates,  never-
theless,  provide important  information for policymaking  by indicating  the  costs  of such
policies.  In  addition,  since  optimization  model  solutions  under  a performance  standard
generate  management  practices  which  reach  the  target  of  10  ppm,  these  management
practices can be used as a guide to set design standards.
For a nitrogen tax targeted to reduce nitrate percolation to 10 ppm, the estimated farmer
net income  loss was  considerably  higher than for all other policies evaluated  ($4,659,000
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and $5,794,000 for risk neutral and risk  averse,  respectively).  Consequently,  government
revenues were also relatively large at $3,270,000 and $4,345,000. This high nitrogen tax is
also consistent with other studies, which indicate  the inelastic  demand for fertilizer (e.g.,
England; Dubgaard). For the same reason, a relatively large nitrogen subsidy was needed to
provide an appropriate economic incentive for reducing nitrate percolation. For the risk-neu-
tral and risk-averse  scenarios, the net gains in farmer net returns under a nitrogen subsidy
policy were $702,000 and $1,300,000, with corresponding government costs of $2,091,000
and $2,832,000.
In addition to high government costs  and a large reduction  in farmer profit, there  are
other advantages and disadvantages of a nitrogen subsidy and nitrogen tax policy. A uniform
nitrogen tax  would be strongly  opposed by the agricultural  sector because it distorts  the
optimal mix of production inputs and  imposes unnecessary  financial  burdens  on farmers
who  use  nitrogen efficiently.  A uniform  nitrogen tax  focuses  exclusively  on how  much
nitrogen is used instead of when, where,  and how it is used. To avoid the tax, farmers may
attempt  to  purchase  nitrogen from  outside  the taxed  region.  However,  enforcement  and
administration of a nitrogen tax would be relatively easy since the tax could be implemented
through fertilizer dealers. The taxing authority would be able to avoid dealing directly with
each  farmer,  which  would  greatly  reduce  the  costs  of tax  collection  and  monitoring.
Revenues  from  a nitrogen  tax  could  be  used to  fund  nitrogen  reduction  education  and
technical assistance programs, as is done in Iowa, or to compensate those whose welfare has
decreased. One option would be to use tax rebates for those who adopt and follow an efficient
nitrogen management plan.8 Unlike a nitrogen tax, political  attractiveness is an important
advantage of nitrogen subsidy. However, once established, it is extremely difficult to revise
or  abandon  a  subsidy  policy. Another  well-known  disadvantage  of a  subsidy  policy  is
slippage, which has plagued agricultural programs in the past.
The preceding  analysis compares  the cost of controlling nitrate percolation in terms of
farmers'  net income  loss  (or gain) and  government revenue (or outlay).  Although the net
income losses under the three design standards were lower than under other policies, design
standards are not included in the comparison because of their inability to reach the target of
nitrate percolation (10 ppm). This conclusion does not necessarily imply that policymakers
should not consider design standards. Along with ease of enforcement, design standards can
be successfully used to minimize NPS pollution once the correlation with water quality has
been established for a specific site.
Evaluating the Benefits and Costs of Pollution Control
An efficient strategy of managing water quality must account for both the costs of reducing
the  pollutants  and  the  benefits  of increased  quality  (Ribaudo).  Since  markets  provide
insufficient  information  about the  value  of groundwater  quality,  techniques  such  as  the
avoidance cost method  (ACM) have been developed to measure lower-bound estimates of
benefits. From a public decision-making  standpoint, the benefit of groundwater  protection
can be viewed  as damage  avoided  from groundwater  contamination.  The avoidance  cost
method, for example, can generate lower-bound estimates of benefits by using expenditure
on bottled water as a proxy for consumer willingness-to-pay  to avoid nitrate exposure. One
8With a proof of fertilizer purchase and a report of crop  acreage confirmed by the county Farm Services Agency office, a
farmer could apply for a tax rebate if the quantity of nitrogen used did not exceed  a given amount.
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key  assumption underlying  this  approach  is that averting  actions  perfectly  substitute  for
pollution reductions.
The cost  of bottled  water  for the  region was  estimated  to  be  $352,000/year.9 The
least-cost policy alternatives for the region were  about $1 million either to farmers or to the
local government.  This cost is approximately  two and one-half to three times  the cost of
bottled  water.  When comparing  the cost of bottled  water  to  the reduction in farmer  net
returns, or to the government' s cost of a subsidy policy, the least costly way to provide "safe"
household water is bottled water. However,  assuming pollution of the aquifer is attributable
to agricultural  practices,  there  is  an opportunity  for the  "polluters"  to compensate  those
impacted by the externality. For example,  a small tax on nitrogen may raise enough funds
to compensate the users of bottled water. Assuming 40 lbs./acre of nitrogen fertilizer is used
on  average,  a  $0.04  tax/lb.  on  nitrogen  fertilizer  would  generate  approximately
$349,000/year, which is the approximate consumer expenditure on bottled water. 10Although
this policy does not exhibit the purity of instruments such as a performance  tax or a tax on
multiple  inputs,  administration  and  enforcement  costs  are  expected  to  be  much  lower.
However, issues such as farmers' purchase of nitrogen outside the taxed region, nonresidents
taking  advantage  of  the  subsidized  bottled  water,  and  the  mechanism  for  taxing  and
distributing the tax dollars to residents must be given serious consideration.
The avoidance  cost  method  ignores  aspects  such  as  ecological  damages  (plants  and
wildlife affected in the ecosystem) or nonuse values. Furthermore, in estimating the potential
averting  costs,  it  was  assumed  that  individuals  in  the  area  who  do  not have  access  to
municipal water would use bottled water.  This assumption ignores  issues such as  accessi-
bility to bottled water, availability of information about health risk, and presence of children
in the household. Despite these limits, a measure of potential averting costs is an important
part of the information needed for policymaking.
Conclusions
This study has investigated alternative policies to attain a target for nitrate percolation for a
representative farm in the Seymour aquifer region of Texas. A performance standard reduced
farm profit by approximately  $1 million, while a performance  tax reduced farmer profit by
approximately  $2.7 million and added $1.7 million to government revenues. A performance
subsidy  resulted in  a  government  outlay of approximately  $1  million. A nitrogen tax  or
subsidy involved relatively large costs to either the farmer or the government.  The overall
implication is that there is approximately  a $1  million annual cost to either the farm or the
local government to meet the EPA standard of 10 ppm.  This comparison is made in terms
of farmers' net income loss and achieving the environmental target of 10 ppm.
The results of this research are not meant to be a recommendation.  In a farm-level study,
the predicted effects  of a policy are conditional  on the characteristics  of the  specific site
modeled. While such efforts are useful, particularly for a relatively small and homogeneous
area  such  as  the  Seymour  aquifer,  predictions  of aggregate  effects  must  be  made  with
caution. It is also worthwhile to reemphasize that since transaction cost and political viability
9  This figure was derived by collecting information  on the number of households that do not have access to municipal water,
expected  average consumption  of bottled water by a household, and price of bottled water (Moore; Fitzgerald;  Scholz). The
information was provided by chamber of commerce, north-central Texas municipal authority, and Jacobs Well, a water bottling
company.
10 (218,200 acres)(40 lbs.)($0.04) = $349,120.
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may dramatically  change the ranking of policy instruments in terms of cost effectiveness,
there is a need for caution in recommending  the cost advantages  of a particular policy.  A
final  note  is  in  order  regarding  the  use  and  interpretation  of avoidance  cost estimates.
Avoidance costs are not a substitute for willingness-to-pay estimates,  and such substitution
may lead to misinterpretation of results. Thus, whenever possible, information about the full
benefits should be obtained through other valuation methods and compared with avoidance
costs.
[Received February  1995; final version received January 1996.]
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